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MARRIAGE, BIOLOGY, AND PATERNITY: THE CASE FOR
REVITALIZING THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION
JANA SINGER*
One of the most striking developments in family law over the past
three decades has been the increasing dissociation of marriage and
legal parenthood. In many ways, this dissociation has been both a
necessary and a good thing. It has been good for the now more than
one-third of American children who are born outside of marriage, in
that it has facilitated their connection to-and allowed them to access
the resources and social capital of-two biologically related adults.' It
has also provided some protection to the many lesbian and gay
couples who are still (in forty-nine states at least) excluded from mar-
riage but who have made a commitment to nurturing and rearing
children together.2 And it has enhanced the financial resources avail-
able to many single parents (still overwhelmingly, but not exclusively,
mothers) who do the vital day-to-day work of simultaneously nurturing
and providing economically for their children.3
But the dissociation of marriage and parenthood has had some
negative-perhaps unanticipated-consequences as well. One of
those consequences has been the erosion of the marital presumption
of paternity as a substantive basis for ascribing parental rights and re-
sponsibilities. Traditionally, the marital presumption assigned legal
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 34% of all births in
the United States in 2002 were to unmarried women, up from 33.5% the previous year.
JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR
2002, 52 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS No. 10, at 8-10 (2003), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52-I.0.pdf.
2. Massachusetts is the only state that currently recognizes same-sex marriage. Good-
ridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). According to the 2000 census,
more than 590,000 households self-identified as same-sex unmarried partners, represent-
ing nearly 1.2 million adults. JUDITH BRADFORD ET AL., NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE
POLICY INST., THE 2000 CENSUS AND SAME-SEx HOUSEHOLDS: A USER'S GUIDE 1 (2002),
available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/census/CensusFull.pdf. Demogra-
phers estimate that between 22% and 28% of lesbian households and between 5% and
14% of gay male households include children. Id. at 10; Dan Black et al., Demographics of
the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United States: Evidence from Available Systematic Data
Sources, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 139, 150 (2000).
3. In 2002, approximately 16.5 million children were living with a single mother,
while 3.3 million children were living with a single father. JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU, CHILDREN'S LMVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002, at 2 tbl.1
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf.
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fatherhood of a child born during marriage to the husband of the
birth mother.4 In an increasing number of cases, however, presumed
fathers (and sometimes mothers) have challenged the marital pre-
sumption and have urged courts to "disestablish" the paternity of chil-
dren born during marriage.' Courts have struggled to respond to
these challenges and have invoked a variety of equitable doctrines to
balance the competing interests of fathers, mothers, and children.6
Increasingly, courts and legislatures have jettisoned the presumption
and have allowed marital fathers to disestablish paternity based on the
results of genetic testing.7 The result in many cases has been to exac-
erbate the trauma associated with divorce and to deprive children of
needed economic and emotional support.8 Jurisprudentially, these
decisions have contributed to a narrow and cramped understanding
of fatherhood, based exclusively on biological ties.
This Article critiques the disestablishment trend and defends the
marital presumption as a substantive rule of law. It argues that, al-
though the original rationale for the presumption has attenuated, its
underlying policy goals remain valid. Marriage matters-and should
continue to matter-in allocating parental rights and responsibilities.
Indeed, the marital presumption may be particularly important in an
age of no-fault divorce, where spousal anger and resentment over the
break-up of a marriage are rendered largely irrelevant to the legal out-
come and often displaced onto disputes over children. The Article
concludes that marriage should generally be a sufficient (albeit not an
exclusive) basis for ascribing legal fatherhood and that the ability of
spouses and former spouses to rebut the marital presumption should
be sharply limited. Additionally, the Article endorses the notion of
dual fatherhood as an option for cases in which a child has both a
marital and an involved genetic father.
Part I of the Article describes the marital presumption and chron-
icles the social, legal, and scientific developments that have contrib-
uted to its erosion. In particular, it links the erosion of the marital
presumption to the increasingly vigorous efforts of federal and state
governments to identify and collect financial support from biological
fathers of children born outside of marriage. Part II describes recent
disestablishment cases involving children born during marriage and
4. See infra Part I.
5. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presump-
tion of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 571-85 (2000).
6. Id. at 551.
7. Id. at 550.
8. Id. at 562.
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examines the procedural and equitable doctrines that some courts
have used to bolster the marital presumption in the face of competing
biological evidence. It concludes that none of these doctrines offers a
persuasive counterweight to the lure of biological determinism. Part
III considers two possible responses to the problem of marital "dises-
tablishment"-the mandatory paternity testing of all children at birth
or a revitalized marital presumption. It concludes that a revitalized
marital presumption better serves the interests of children and is
more consistent with society's stake in valuing marriage.
I. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION
The marital presumption of paternity is the legal rule that identi-
fies the husband of a married woman as the legal father of any child
born during that marriage. At one time, this presumption was nearly
irrebuttable.9 It could be overcome only by strong evidence that the
husband was sterile or did not have access to his wife during the cru-
cial period of conception.10 Moreover, the types of evidence that a
court could consider in overcoming the presumption were extremely
limited. In particular, under what became known as Lord Mansfield's
rule, the husband and wife themselves could not testify regarding the
husband's lack of access.1' Lord Mansfield explained the reason for
this restriction: "[I] t is a rule, founded in decency, morality, and pol-
icy, that they shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that they
have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is spurious
"12
The marital presumption of paternity traditionally served a num-
ber of overlapping goals. First, because biological paternity was diffi-
cult to establish, the marital presumption provided legal certainty for
9. Paula Roberts, Biology and Beyond: The Case for Passage of the New Uniform Parentage
Act, 35 F m. L.Q. 41, 44 (2001). Indeed, "[flor centuries, a child born during a marriage
was conclusively presumed to be the child of that marriage." Id.; see also HARRV D. KRAUSE,
ILLEGITIMACY 15-17 (1971) (detailing the history of the marital presumption).
10. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion). Tradition-
ally, the presumption of legitimacy could be rebutted "only by proof that a husband was
incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant period." Id.
According to Blackstone, nonaccess could be proved only "if the husband be out of the
kingdom of England (or, as the law somewhat loosely phrases it, extra quatuor maria) for
above nine months.. . ." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *457.
11. Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist Interpretation of the Law of Legitimacy, 7 TEx. J. WO-
MEN & L. 195, 196 (1998).
12. Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B.). This restriction on
spousal testimony has largely been abolished, even in states that retain some version of the
marital presumption. See, e.g., Serafin v. Serafin, 258 N. W.2d 461, 463 (Mich. 1977) (holding
that a husband and wife may testify about nonaccess, even though there is still a rebuttable presump-
tion of legitimacy).
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purposes such as inheritance and succession. 3 Second, the presump-
tion preserved the integrity of marriage, at least where both parties to
the marriage so desired.14 Third, the strong version of the presump-
tion promoted the welfare of children, because, if the marital pre-
sumption were rebutted, the consequences for the child were
devastating: The child was declared a bastard, or fillius nullius-liter-
ally the "son of nobody"-and was no longer entitled to support or
inheritance from either parent. 5 The social consequences were dev-
astating as well, for both the child and the mother.
16
A series of social, economic, and scientific developments has con-
tributed to the erosion of the marital presumption over the past thirty-
five years. Of particular importance has been the sharp increase in
childbearing outside of marriage and the accompanying efforts of fed-
eral and state authorities to secure financial support for nonmarital
children from their biological fathers. 17 As the percentage of chil-
dren born outside of marriage has climbed, paternity establishment
and child support enforcement have become key components of na-
13. SeeJoseph Cullen Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REV. 22, 23 (1902)
("[S]ince it is necessary that the heir should be one whose right could be ascertained,
therefore marriage, an act capable of proof, could be relied upon as determining the
heir."); Laurence C. Nolan, " Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme
Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U.
L. REv. 1, 7 (1999) ("Marriage provided certainty in the law as it pertained to paternity,
avoided fraudulent claims to paternity, and facilitated the administration of decedents'
estates.").
14. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125 ("A secondary policy concern was the interest in pro-
moting the 'peace and tranquility of States and families,' a goal that is obviously impaired
by facilitating suits against husband and wife asserting that their children are illegitimate."
(citation omitted)); see Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the Pater-
nity of Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 56 (2003) (noting that the presumption "protects
the sanctity of marriages by assuming the husband and wife have both remained true to
their marriage vows").
15. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *459; see also Davis v. Houston, 2 Yeates 289, 290 (Pa.
1798) (observing that a child born out of wedlock could not inherit or legally convey a title
for inherited land); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 197 (1985) (explaining
the legal discrimination against illegitimate children).
16. SeeJohn M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1383 n.2 (Pa. 1990) ("[T]he status 'illegi-
mate' historically subjected a child so labelled to significant legal and social
discrimination.").
17. See Glennon, supra note 5, at 550 ("State laws targeted at identifying and collecting
child support from unwed fathers have had the collateral effect of widening the circum-
stances in which the marital presumption of paternity can be challenged."); see also Ira
Mark Ellman, Thinking About Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36 FAM. L.Q.
49, 51 (2002) (attributing the problem of paternal ambiguity to three social and scientific
developments: "the increasing proportion of children born out of wedlock .... the in-
creasing determination of policymakers to collect support from absent fathers," and "the
ability to establish biological paternity through genetic tests").
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tional welfare policy.18 Indeed, the enforcement of child support obli-
gations is one of the few antipoverty strategies on which conservatives
and liberals generally agree.19 As a result, "making fathers pay at vari-
ous stages of the life cycle" has provided the most consistent theme in
federal efforts to reform the welfare system.2 °
The federal government has played a leading role in identifying
and obligating biological fathers. 2' For example, over the past two
decades, Congress has used its spending power to require states to
enact specific and detailed procedures for establishing paternity and
collecting child support from unmarried men identified as fathers.
22
These federally mandated procedures include in-hospital paternity es-
tablishment programs, presumptive child support guidelines, auto-
matic wage withholding, and a parent-locator service that uses "all
sources of information and available records" to track down noncus-
todial parents. 23 Federal law also requires states to extend the statute
of limitations for paternity actions until the child's eighteenth birth-
day24 and to eliminate jury trials in paternity cases.25
Early and expedited procedures for voluntary acknowledgement
of paternity are an important component of the federal scheme.
18. Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996
Welfare Act, 30 FAm. L.Q. 519, 527 (1996).
19. David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-Sup-
port Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REv. 2575, 2582-83 (1995). See generally Stephen D. Sugarman,
Financial Support of Children and the End of Welfare as We Know It, 81 VA. L. REv. 2523 (1995)
(discussing conservative and liberal approaches to providing for impoverished children).
For an early critique of this perspective, see Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits
of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 380-92 (arguing that
enforcing child support obligations is not enough to deal with the problem of child
poverty).
20. Chambers, supra note 19, at 2582-83.
21. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'v & L.
541 (1998).
22. Under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, the federal government provides states
with sixty-six percent of the basic cost of running a child support program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 655(a) (2) (C) (2000). In order to qualify for this money, however, states must enact cer-
tain laws relating to paternity establishment and child support enforcement. Id. § 666. A
state that fails to pass a required law cannot obtain approval of its state child support plan.
Id. § 654. This means it is ineligible for federal child support funds. Id. § 655(a) (3) (A).
In addition, in order to draw down federal Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF)
funds, a state must be able to certify that it has an approved child support plan. Id.
§ 602(a) (2). Thus, without an approvable plan, the state is also ineligible for federal TANF
funds. Id. "While a state could decline to take federal money and thereby be under no
obligation to enact these laws, every state has taken federal funds and enacted the required
state statutes." Roberts, supra note 9, at 42 n.1.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 654(8) (A); see Estin, supra note 21, at 581-87 (discussing the federal
requirements states must meet to receive federal child support funding).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (A) (ii).
25. Id. § 666(a) (5) (I).
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Studies in the 1990s found that nonmarital births were often the prod-
uct of established, rather than casual relationships, and that a signifi-
cant percentage of unmarried fathers were present at the hospital at
the time of a child's birth.2 6 Researchers also found that many fathers
were eager to acknowledge their connection to a child during the ini-
tial months after birth but that their involvement and interest de-
clined rapidly as time progressed.2 7 Influenced by these findings,
Congress in 1993 required states to develop "a simple civil process for
voluntarily acknowledging paternity."2" This process must include a
hospital-based program in which parents are asked to sign an affidavit
of voluntary acknowledgement immediately before or after the child's
birth.29 Once the affidavit is signed by the mother and the alleged
father, it becomes the equivalent of a legal finding of paternity, ° sub-
ject only to a brief rescission period.3 '
No judicial or administrative proceedings are necessary to ratify
an unchallenged acknowledgement of paternity,3 2 and voluntary
acknowledgements are entitled to full faith and credit in other
states.3 3 As an added incentive for voluntary acknowledgement, Con-
gress provided that the name of an unmarried father may be included
on the birth certificate only if the mother and father have signed a
voluntary acknowledgement or if there has been an adjudication of
paternity." In light of these "tangible legal consequences," federal
law requires that, prior to signing a voluntary acknowledgement,
mothers and purported fathers must be clearly informed of the legal
26. See, e.g., Legler, supra note 18, at 529-30 (discussing a study by Esther Wattenburg
that focused on the relationship of young parents at the time of "out-of-wedlock" births).
According to the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, conducted by researchers at
Princeton University, eighty-two percent of mothers and fathers who are unmarried are
romantically involved at the time their child is born, and forty-four percent are living to-
gether. PRINCETON UNIV. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING ET AL., FRAGILE FAMILIES
RESEARCH BRIEF: DISPELLING MYTHS ABOUT UNMARRIED FATHERS 1 (2000), available at
http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/briefs/researchbriefl.pdf [hereinafter FRAGILE
FAMILIES RESEARCH BRIEF].
27. Legler, supra note 18, at 529-30; see FRAGILE FAMILIES RESEARCH BRIEF, supra note 26,
at 2 (observing that a large percentage of the fathers interviewed visited their child in the
hospital and reported that they wanted to be involved in raising their child).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (C) (i).
29. Id. § 666(a) (5) (C) (ii).
30. Id. § 666(a) (5) (E).
31. Id. § 666(a) (5) (D) (iii); see People ex. rel. Dep't of Pub. Aid v. Smith, 818 N.E.2d
1204, 1213 (Il1. 2004) (holding that voluntary acknowledgement created a conclusive pre-
sumption of biological paternity which could not be attacked in the absence of fraud,
duress, or material mistake-of-fact).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (E).
33. Id. § 666(a) (5) (C) (iv).
34. Id. § 666(a) (5) (D) (i).
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consequences. 35 However, reports of in-hospital programs reveal that
hospital staff responsible for obtaining the acknowledgements are
often poorly trained and that the legal consequences are often down-
played in an effort to meet performance goals and encourage unmar-
ried fathers to acknowledge paternity.
3 6
More recently, the federal government has broadened its focus
from mandating procedures to monitoring results and has enacted a
series of financial penalties and incentive payments tied to state pater-
nity establishment rates.37 States that fail to meet federal targets for
paternity establishment face financial penalties, while states that main-
tain high rates of paternity establishment and child support collection
share in a pool of incentive bonuses.3" These provisions send the
clear message that states are responsible for identifying the biological
fathers of children born outside of marriage and that biological fa-
therhood alone imposes enforceable support responsibilities.3 9
Central to these regulatory efforts have been scientific advances
in DNA testing which can now determine, with an extremely high de-
gree of accuracy, whether or not a particular man is genetically re-
lated to a particular child.4" Federal law has encouraged states to
35. Id. § 666(a) (5) (C) (i).
36. See Anne Greenwood, Comment, Predatory Paternity Establishment: A Critical Analysis
of the Acknowledgment of Paternity Process in Texas, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421, 438-44 (2004) (dis-
cussing the shortcomings of the voluntary acknowledgement process in Texas).
37. Federal law establishes the goal of a 90% paternity establishment rate. 42 U.S.C.
§ 652(g) (1) (A). States that fall below this standard must increase their establishment rates
by a specified percentage each year in order to remain eligible for federal funding. Id.
§ 652(g) (1) (B)-(F). A state with a paternity establishment percentage between 75% and
89% must improve its IV-D paternity establishment percentage for the next fiscal year by
two percentage points; between 50% and 74%, a state must improve by three percentage
points; between 45% and 49%, a state must improve by four percentage points; between
40% and 44%, a state must improve by five percentage points; and, a state with a IV-D
paternity establishment percentage of less than 40% must improve by six percentage
points. Id. Failure to meet these improvement goals results in a loss of TANF funds. Id.
§ 609(a) (5).
38. See id. (describing penalties); id. § 655 (describing the formula for incentive
payments).
39. See Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed: Federalization of Enforcement Nears Comple-
tion, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 701-02 ("As a general rule, if a man can be shown to be the
biological father of a child, he has a support obligation ... ."); Glennon, supra note 5, at
558 ("The child support system for children born out of wedlock is based on the assump-
tion that biological fatherhood is a sufficient basis for legal and financial responsibility for
a child.").
40. See Legler, supra note 18, at 533 (describing "up-front" genetic testing as the key to
the streamlined processes for paternity establishment mandated by federal law). For a
discussion of several of the social developments that have contributed to the expansion of
DNA-based identity testing, see Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity
Testing and the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM.J.L. & MED. 215 (2002). For a
thoughtful discussion of the influence of genetic information on traditional and modern
252 [VOL. 65:246
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expand the use of DNA testing and to place primary reliance on ge-
netic evidence in contested paternity proceedings involving
nonmarital children. For example, states must authorize their child
support agencies to order genetic tests administratively, without the
need for judicial approval, and to obtain a signed acknowledgement
of paternity based on the results of the testing.4" States must also
adopt procedures requiring parties in contested paternity proceed-
ings to submit to genetic testing at the request of any party, subject to
a limited "good cause" exception.42 If paternity remains contested,
states must also facilitate the admission of DNA evidence and must
adopt either a rebuttable or a conclusive presumption of paternity
based on the results of the genetic tests.43
Although DNA technology was envisioned as a tool to establish pa-
ternity without the need forjudicial involvement," it has been eagerly
embraced by litigants who seek to disestablish their status as legal par-
ents.45 In particular, growing numbers of nonmarital fathers who pre-
viously acknowledged paternity or whose status was adjudicated in the
absence of DNA evidence, have petitioned to set aside existing pater-
nityjudgments and extinguish the support obligations that flow from
those judgments. These disestablishment petitions are sometimes ac-
companied by a request for court-ordered DNA testing; increasingly,
however, petitioners come to court already armed with genetic evi-
dence.46 Popular media attention to the issue of paternity, along with
the marketing efforts of laboratories, have contributed to this trend.4 7
Indeed, two bio-ethicists recently observed that "[g]enetic testing to
determine paternity has become a staple of daytime and evening soap
operas. 4 8
understandings of the family, see Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics:
The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REv. 523 (2000).
41. Elrod, supra note 39, at 704.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (B). The state must pay the costs of such testing, but may
elect to recoup the costs from the alleged father, if paternity is established. Id.
43. Id. § 666(a) (5) (F)-(G).
44. Legler, supra note 18, at 535.
45. See CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT: CHILD SUPPORT AND BE-
YOND 15 (2003) (noting that "advances in genetic testing have contributed to an unantici-
pated increase in disestablishment actions"); Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 40, at 218-19
(discussing links between DNA testing, the fathers' rights movement, and paternity dises-
tablishment suits); see also Adam Pertman, DNA Tests Emerging as Legal Weapon in Child Sup-
port Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 2000, at Al.
46. See Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I. Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-
Marital Children, 37 FAm. L.Q. 35, 37 (2003).
47. Id. at 37-38.
48. Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 40, at 221. Several TV talk shows have even fea-
tured "live" paternity testing. Id.
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Courts and legislatures have struggled to respond to these dises-
tablishment requests. Initially, many courts were reluctant to reopen
paternity judgments, citing both finality and child-welfare concerns.49
As DNA technology has become more widely accepted, however, the
tide has turned, and nonmarital fathers in many states now enjoy a
relatively unfettered right to disestablish paternity based on later-ac-
quired DNA evidence. For example, Maryland recently amended its
paternity statutes to provide that "[a] declaration of paternity may be
. . . set aside .. . if a blood or genetic test done in accordance with
[statutory requirements] establishes the exclusion of the individual
named as the father in the order."5 ° The statute contains no time
limit on such disestablishment actions, and trial judges have no au-
thority to consider the child's best interests in responding to a request
for genetic testing.51 Moreover, the Maryland Court of Appeals has
held that, once a paternity judgment is set aside on the basis of a ge-
netic test, not only are future child support obligations eliminated,
but any outstanding arrearages are extinguished as well.5 2 As one ju-
dicial critic has noted, this ruling gives obligors who previously ac-
knowledged paternity but are now unhappy with their child support
obligations a strong incentive to file disestablishment requests because
"they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. ' 53
Paternity disestablishment cases involving nonmarital fathers
raise difficult questions of how best to balance concerns for finality,
49. See, e.g., Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 324-25, 648 A.2d 439, 449 (1994)
(observing in 1994 that numerous jurisdictions gave conclusive effect to judicial findings of
paternity).
50. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1038(a) (2) (i) (LexisNexis 2004). The statute was
passed in response to a court of appeals decision that refused, on res judicata grounds, to
reopen a pair of paternity judgments, despite the results of genetic tests, performed years
after entry of the judgments, which excluded the legal fathers. Tandra S., 336 Md. at 324,
648 A.2d at 449.
51. Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 437, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (2000). But cf. Evans v.
Wilson, 382 Md. 614, 636, 856 A.2d 679, 692 (2004) (noting that the amended statute does
not apply to paternity proceedings involving a child born during a marriage).
52. Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 788 A.2d 609 (2002). In Walter, the court declined
to decide whether a litigant who successfully disestablishes paternity is also entitled to reim-
bursement (from either the child or the mother) for support moneys previously paid
under the now-extinguished paternityjudgment. Id. at 390 n.2, 788 A.2d at 611 n.2. Other
courts have been more reluctant to extinguish arrearages under a vacated paternity judg-
ment. See, e.g., State ex rel. L.L.B. v. Hill, 682 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Neb. 2004) (holding that an
adjudicated father will be liable for arrearages when his own lack of diligence led to the
accumulation of such arrearages). But cf Andrew S. Epstein, The Parent Trap: Should a
Man Be Allowed to Recoup Child Support Payments If He Discovers He is Not the Biological Father of
the Child, 42 BRANDElS L.J. 655, 669-70 (2004) (advocating a more flexible approach to
child support reimbursement claims).
53. Langston, 359 Md. at 450 n.4, 754 A.2d at 418 n.4 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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fairness, and child welfare. Too often, the paternity determinations in
question are the product of default judgments entered against unrep-
resented defendants or were based on "voluntary acknowledgements"
that were considerably less than fully informed. 4 These problems are
likely to persist as a result of the federal mandates described above,
which encourage states to establish paternity as expeditiously and as
cheaply as possible. 55 For purposes of this Article, however, the criti-
cal question is whether marriage adds anything to the analysis. If
nonmarital "fathers" are permitted to disestablish paternity, based on
later-acquired genetic evidence, should marital fathers enjoy a similar
entitlement? Or should marriage constitute an independent basis for
assigning paternal rights and responsibilities?
II. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION IN THE COURTS
A review of recent case law suggests that the growing ability of
nonmarital fathers to disestablish paternity has had a significant spill-
over effect on parentage disputes involving children born during mar-
riage. Although courts are still reluctant to disrupt an ongoing
relationship between a child and a marital father, the force of the
marital presumption has weakened considerably, particularly where a
divorced (or divorcing) husband seeks to disestablish paternity on the
basis of contrary genetic evidence.
A. An Illustrative Case
The erosion of the marital presumption is starkly illustrated by
the 2003 Pennsylvania case of Doran v. Doran.5 6 Doran involved a peti-
tion by a divorced father to dismiss a child support order that had
been entered as part of his earlier divorce. 57 Mr. Doran filed his peti-
tion more than six years after his divorce was finalized and nearly
eleven and one-half years after the birth of the child in question.5 8
54. According to the Los Angeles Times, over seventy percent of the paternity establish-
ments in Los Angeles County in 1998 were by default judgments. Megan Garvey, Net to
Snag Deadbeats Also Snares Innocent; County: Mix-ups Have Cost Time, Money and Reputation of
Hundreds of Men, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at BI.
55. See generally Greenwood, supra note 36, at 423-25 (describing Texas's efforts to le-
gally bind potential fathers in an expeditious manner and the resulting danger that a fa-
ther may unknowingly bind himself to support a child that is not his biological child).
56. 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
57. Id. at 1281.
58. Mr. Doran's divorce decree was entered on May 12, 1995, just before his son's fifth
birthday. Id. The decree incorporated a child support order previously entered by the
court on August 31, 1994. Id. Mr. Doran filed his petition to dismiss the child support
order on October 26, 2001, "nearly eleven and one half years after the birth of the child for
whom he pays support." Id.
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The basis for Mr. Doran's petition was a DNA test that he had per-
suaded his ex-wife and child to undergo after becoming suspicious
about the lack of physical resemblance between the child and him-
self.59 The test confirmed the lack of a biological connection between
Mr. Doran and the son that he had supported and co-parented for
more than eleven years.6" In his petition, Mr. Doran not only sought
relief from future child support obligations, but he also sought reim-
bursement of all support amounts previously paid.61 The mother
raised a number of defenses, starting with the marital presumption of
paternity.62
The court, however, quickly concluded that the presumption did
not apply to the case.6" It reasoned that because the policy underlying
the presumption of paternity is the preservation of marriages, the pre-
sumption applies only in cases where that policy would be advanced. 64
In a case such as this one, where the parties are already divorced and
there is no longer an intact marriage to preserve, the court concluded
flatly that "the presumption of paternity is not applicable."6"
In my view, this represents an unduly cramped view of the pur-
pose of the marital presumption. It is true that one of the traditional
purposes of the presumption was to preserve the sanctity of mar-
riage." But another, equally important purpose was to protect the
interests of children.67 This "child welfare" purpose was traditionally
focused on protecting a child from the stigma and severe legal conse-
quences of illegitimacy-consequences that have been significantly
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Mr. Doran's petition to dismiss requested "that the... child support order be
dismissed and that he be entitled to recover all of the child support paid to his ex-wife." Id.
(quoting trial court decision).
62. Id. at 1282.
63. Id. at 1283.
64. Id.
65. Id. Similarly, as the court in Michael K. T. v. Tina L. T. noted,
In the face of a defunct or nearly defunct marriage, the need to uphold the sanc-
tity of the traditional nuclear family fails as a justification for avoiding bastardiza-
tion. Furthermore, when the issue of paternity is raised during a divorce
proceeding, preserving the family no longer stands as a valid defense to
bastardization.
387 S.E.2d 866, 870 (W. Va. 1989).
66. Doran, 820 A.2d at 1283.
67. See Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 909 (Vt. 1998) ("Protecting innocent children
from the social burdens of illegitimacy, ensuring their financial and emotional security,
and ultimately preserving the stability of the family unit all contributed to the origins of the
parental presumption, and all help to explain its enduring power today.").
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ameliorated but have not disappeared.68 But allowing separated or
divorcing parents to contest the parentage of children born during a
marriage is likely to have other detrimental consequences for chil-
dren. In particular, social science research has shown that children's
adjustment to divorce depends significantly on their parents' behavior
during and after the separation process and, more specifically, on the
level of parental conflict.69 The higher the level of parental conflict,
the more negative the effects of divorce on children.70
This social science evidence suggests that the reasoning of the
Doran court is precisely backward. The marital presumption of pater-
nity is most valuable precisely where there is no longer an intact mar-
riage to preserve-that is, where spouses are seeking to dissolve their
partnership or perhaps where a third party is seeking to displace a
marital parent. In these contexts, the presumption serves the valuable
function of preventing the spouses from allowing their antagonism
and disappointment with each other to infect their relationships with
children born and raised during the marriage. Indeed, one can argue
that the presumption is particularly important in an era of no-fault
divorce, because the no-fault system renders such feelings of anger
and disappointment largely irrelevant to the availability and financial
consequences of divorce and often displaces them onto disputes over
children.
Not all courts are as openly dismissive of the marital presumption
as the Doran court. But even when courts acknowledge the presump-
tion, they increasingly view it as a procedural device or a rule of evi-
dence, which can be overcome by convincing evidence of contrary
fact.7 1 Scientifically accurate DNA tests present precisely this sort of
convincing contrary evidence. And the increased ease and reduced
cost of DNA testing means that previously married parents who seek
to disestablish paternity are increasingly likely to come into court al-
ready armed with DNA evidence, rather than having to ask a court to
68. SeeJana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1448-49
(discussing the economic and social circumstances of a child born out of wedlock com-
pared to a child born during marriage).
69. See generally ANNA L. DAVIS ET AL., MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF DIVORCE ON CHILDREN
THROUGH FAMILY-FocuSED COURT REFORM 3-7 (1997); ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN,
COURTS, AND CUSTODY. INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 27-35 (2004).
70. See SCHEPARD, supra note 69, at 31 ("Children who are exposed to more intense
conflict between parents are more likely to suffer harm resulting from their parents' di-
vorce. The lower the level of conflict between parents, the more likely those children will
emerge emotionally whole.").
71. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (citing cases that have allowed the marital
presumption to be overcome by contrary DNA evidence).
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order testing.72 In the face of such "incontrovertible" scientific evi-
dence, the marital presumption is easily overcome.73
For this reason, courts that continue to restrict the ability of di-
vorced or divorcing spouses to disestablish paternity increasingly base
their decisions not on the marital presumption itself but on procedu-
ral and equitable notions of res judicata and estoppel.7' But neither
of these doctrines offers a persuasive counterweight to genetic "truth."
Moreover, the use of these doctrines to shore up the marital presump-
tion suggests that the presumption is primarily a technical legal rule
rather than a substantive statement about family relationships and re-
sponsibilities. Nor does the "best interests of the child" standard in-
voked by some courts in disestablishment cases furnish a satisfactory
alternative to a revitalized marital presumption.
B. Res Judicata
Courts applying resjudicata notions to prevent a marital father or
mother from attempting to disavow paternity generally reason that pa-
ternity was a matter necessarily determined as part of the original di-
vorce decree and the parties are therefore precluded from relitigating
the issue.75 For example, in In re Marriage of Betty L. W v. William
E. W, 6 the West Virginia Supreme Court rejected an ex-husband's pe-
tition to terminate child support based on DNA evidence that he was
not the biological father of the child in question. The court ruled
that the husband's paternity had been established by his admissions
72. Prospective litigants can easily order paternity testing kits online. Dozens of web
sites advertise reasonably priced home testing kits. See, e.g., DNA Paternity Testing, http://
www.dnanow.com (last visited Dec. 28, 2005) (kits shipped free; fee of $205 if samples are
sent back for testing); International Paternity Labs, http://www.internationalpaternity.
corn (last visited Dec. 28, 2005) (kit plus results for $150); Worldwide Genetics DNA Test-
ing Center, http://www.worldwidepaternity.com (last visited Dec. 28, 2005) (home testing
kit plus results for $175).
73. See, e.g., Symonds v. Symonds, 432 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Mass. 1982) (reversing trial
court's denial of husband's request for blood testing during divorce proceedings on
grounds that "[a] married man should have no duty to support a child born to his wife
during their marriage but fathered by another man, any more than a wife should have a
duty to support a child fathered by her husband during their marriage but born of another
woman").
74. See discussion infra Part II.B (exploring how courts have applied resjudicata princi-
ples in recent disestablishment case law).
75. E.g., Hotz v. Hotz, 214 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. Daniels v.
Daniels, 817 P.2d 632 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Harris v. Harris, 591 P.2d 1147 (Nev. 1979);
Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998); Nancy Darlene M. v. James Lee M., 400 S.E.2d
882 (W Va. 1990). See also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Effect, in Subsequent Proceedings,
of Paternity Findings or Implications in Divorce or Annulment Decree or in Support or Custody Order
Made Incidental Thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 846, 853 (1977).
76. 569 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 2002).
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during divorce proceedings six years earlier and by a provision in the
divorce decree that three children had been born of the marriage.77
Thus, the court found that res judicata principles barred either the
husband or the wife from relitigating the issue of paternity.78 Signifi-
cantly, the majority in Betty L. W. noted that the husband had not al-
leged fraud in the procurement of the paternity finding in the divorce
decree, 9 thus inviting future claimants to seek an exception to res
judicata principles-an exception that the dissenting judge would ap-
ply "in every case where a wife gives birth to a child cognizant of the
fact that paternity is uncertain, yet remains silent while her husband
innocently assumes the care of the child."8°
Even without the use of such allegations, the Betty L. W. court's
reliance on res judicata principles is undermined by the reasoning of
recent cases involving nonmarital fathers, where concerns for finality
and repose have been trumped by appeals to scientific fact and by the
perceived unfairness of requiring a man to support a child that is not
biologically "his." When the issue is framed as finality versus Truth
with a capital T, Truth has a tendency to prevail.8 ' Recognizing the
power of this formulation, disestablishment proponents have analo-
gized their cause to the growing use of DNA evidence to exonerate
77. Id. at 80.
78. Id. at 85 ("In the present case, the action was brought by a party to the initial
paternity finding, and consequently, the principles of res judicata apply to preclude this
action.").
79. Id. at 86 n.13.
80. Id. at 87-88 (Maynard, J., dissenting) (quoting William L. v. Cindy E.L., 495 S.E.2d
836, 842 (W. Va. 1997)).
81. See, e.g., DeRico v. Wilson, 714 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (conclud-
ing that DNA evidence of nonpaternity justified the granting of ex-husband's petition to
modify divorce decree and eliminate child support obligations, because marital father has
"no legal duty to provide support for children he neither biologically fathered, adopted,
nor contracted to care for"); Crowder v. Commonwealth ex rel. Gregory, 745 S.W.2d 149,
151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set
aside a six-year-old paternity judgment because "[j]ustice is the court's constant destina-
tion, relentlessly pursued. It is not arrived at where a court in a paternity action adjudi-
cates a man to be the father of a child while knowing full well that the biological
relationship has been clearly disestablished."); Rafferty v. Perkins, 757 So. 2d 992, 996
(Miss. 2000) (finding, in postdivorce proceeding, that no reasonable jury could sustain
marital presumption in the face of DNA evidence showing 99.94% probability that some-
one other than husband was the biological father); Rydberg v. Rydberg, 678 N.W.2d 534,
540 (N.D. 2004) (holding that genetic test results constitute "clear and convincing evi-
dence" sufficient to rebut marital presumption of paternity); see also Anthony Miller, Base-
line, Bright-line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for California to Provide Certainty in
Determining Parentage, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 642 (2003) (advocating genetic-biological
testing as the baseline for determining legal parentage).
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defendants wrongfully convicted of rape or murder.12 In particular,
fathers' rights advocates have argued that 'Just as DNA evidence has
revolutionized criminal law, so should it, in roughly parallel ways, lead
to a revolution in family law." 3
Indeed, courts and legislatures in a number of states have already
carved out exceptions to preclusion rules in the context of paternity
disestablishment. For example, a number of states have enacted stat-
utes that explicitly override res judicata principles to allow an adjudi-
cated father to disestablish his paternity based on DNA evidence."4 In
enacting the Ohio disestablishment statute, the General Assembly de-
clared that it is a man's "substantive right" to obtain judicial relief in
such a situation. 5 Similarly, a number of courts have held that a hus-
band is not precluded from challenging a paternity determination in
a prior divorce decree where his wife misled him into believing that
82. E.g., Steve Duin, This DNA Test Is a Test of His Patience, OREGONIAN, June 6, 2000, at
B01 ("It's amazing to me that the same evidence that can be used to convict an individual
is not readily used to exonerate an individual. You can't have it both ways. If this is the
high-tech science we both know it is, the court has to deal with the results, despite the
extenuating circumstances.") (quoting Brad Popovich, Director of the DNA Diagnostic
Lab at Oregon Health Sciences University); see Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want
to Be Daddy Anymore: an Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
193, 194 (2004) (describing "grassroots movement" that likens "newly discovered evidence
of nonpaternity to DNA testing that exonerates a felon"); Martin Kasindorf, Men Wage
Battle on 'Paternity Fraud, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2002, at 3A (explaining how many men are
working to fight court orders that are forcing them to pay child support for children who
are not their biological offspring).
83. Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 40, at 220 (describing arguments made by the
fathers' rights movement).
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1 (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2004) (permitting an adju-
dicated father to reopen a paternity judgment at any time based on DNA evidence); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-7-54(a) (2004) (allowing a male ordered to pay child support to set aside a
paternity determination based on after-acquired genetic evidence); OtIo R~v. CODE ANN.
§ 3119.962 (LexisNexis 2003) (requiring courts to grant relief from paternityjudgments or
child support orders based on results of genetic testing); Jackson v. Newsome, 758 N.E.2d
342, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (explaining that the 1998 amendment to the Illinois paternity
statute was intended to override resjudicata principles and "specifically to allow an adjudi-
cated father to collaterally attack this previous adjudication if subsequent DNA tests estab-
lished that he was not the father"); cf Ex parteJenkins v. M.A.B., 723 So. 2d 649, 655-58
(Ala. 1998) (holding that ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1 could not constitutionally be applied to
paternity judgments entered before its enactment).
85. H.B. 242, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000). Lower courts in Ohio have reached
conflicting results on whether this legislative rewriting of resjudicata requirements violates
separation of powers. Compare, e.g., Poskarbiewicz v. Poskarbiewicz, 787 N.E.2d 688, 691
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding statutes unconstitutional), and Van Dusen v. Van Dusen,
784 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (same), with State ex reL Lloyd v. Lovelady, No.
83090, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3294, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. July 8, 2004) (finding statute
constitutional).
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he was the child's biological father.8 6 Other courts have questioned
whether paternity was actually "at issue" in a divorce where the matter
was not disputed and the children were simply assumed to have been
born "of the marriage.
8 7
Moreover, resjudicata principles are inapplicable where a marital
father (or mother) seeks to disestablish paternity at the time of initial
separation or divorce because there will not have been any prior judi-
cial determination to uphold. 8 They are also inapplicable to disestab-
lishment actions brought by someone who was not a party to the
original divorce proceedings-for example, a putative biological
father.8 "
C. Equitable Estoppel
Where preclusion principles do not apply, a number of courts
have invoked the equitable-estoppel doctrine to prevent marital fa-
thers (and mothers) from attempting to disestablish paternity. 0 But
86. E.g., Love v. Love, 959 P.2d 523, 526 (Nev. 1998); Libro v. Walls, 746 P.2d 632, 634
(Nev. 1987); Evans v. Gunter, 366 S.E.2d 44, 46-47 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). Husbands may
also avoid the res judicata effect of a prior divorce judgment by filing a timely motion
under the state's equivalent of Federal Rule 60(b), which allows for the reopening of a
final judgment because of fraud, duress, or material mistake-of-fact, typically within one
year of entry of the judgment. Roberts, supra note 14, at 61. "The rule also allows judg-
ments to be set aside prospectively 'in the interests of justice' if the litigant acts within a
'reasonable time' to rectify the error." Id.
87. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Cornelius, 15 P.3d 528, 531 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (examining
whether the issue of paternity had been sufficiently presented to the trial court during a
divorce proceeding); McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 259-60 (Wash. 1987) (conclud-
ing that the issue of paternity had not been litigated in a prior proceeding); cf R.E. v.
C.E.W., 752 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1999) (rejecting the application of collateral estoppel
to the paternity declaration in the divorce decree on grounds that the husband's "actual
paternity was not litigated in the prior [divorce] action").
88. At least one commentator has argued that the effect of applying preclusion princi-
ples to paternity determinations contained in divorce decrees will be to encourage men to
contest paternity at the time of divorce. See Meghan R. Dimond, Note, Civil Procedure-
Collateral Estoppel as a Bar to Post-Divorce Litigation of Paternity-Tedford v. Gregory, 30 N.M.
L. Rtv. 95, 104 (2000) (asserting that, where courts give preclusive effect to paternity ad-
missions in divorce decrees, "divorce attorneys would be remiss if they did not encourage
their male clients to deny paternity as a matter of course in a divorce proceeding").
89. See, e.g., State ex reL W.V. Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. Michael George K, 531
S.E.2d 669, 678 (W. Va. 2000) (holding that paternity determinations in divorce decrees
"are not res judicata and do not inure to the benefit of a putative parent in an action
brought on behalf of the child to obtain support").
90. See, e.g., Pedregon v. Pedregon, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 865-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(applying the doctrine of "parentage by estoppel" to impose a child support obligation on
a husband who knowingly held himself out as the child's father for more than ten years
and discouraged his wife from contacting the child's biological father).
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estoppel doctrine has some significant limitations as well."1 Equitable
estoppel generally requires both a knowing misrepresentation by the
party sought to be estopped and detrimental reliance on that misrep-
resentation by another.12 Where a marital father claims-often quite
convincingly-that he was not aware during marriage of the real facts
surrounding the child's conception, most courts reason that he could
not "knowingly" have misrepresented his parenthood to the child in
question. 3
Moreover, even where a husband's conduct meets the misrepre-
sentation requirement, courts have found that the family's reliance on
that conduct was not sufficiently detrimental to justify the application
of estoppel principles. Indeed, courts have been especially reluctant
to view the emotional harm that a child experiences as a result of a
parent's rejection as sufficient detriment to satisfy estoppel require-
ments.94 Only where the child has suffered a financial detriment-for
91. See Theresa Glennon, Expendable Children: Defining Belonging in a Broken World, 8
DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 269, 275-77 (2001) (discussing elements of equitable estoppel
and asserting that most states have not applied the doctrine to preclude a husband from
denying paternity at the time of divorce).
92. In Breen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court stated,
There are two essential elements to an estoppel: the party must do or say some-
thing which is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the exis-
tence of certain facts and to act upon that belief; and the other party, influenced
thereby, must actually change his position or do something to his injury which he
otherwise would not have done.
220 A.2d 254, 259 (Conn. 1966). Similarly, in Miller v. Miller, the court noted,
To establish a claim of equitable estoppel, the claiming party must show that the
alleged conduct was done, or representation was made, intentionally or under
such circumstances that it was both natural and probable that it would induce
action. Further, the conduct must be relied on, and the relying party must act so
as to change his or her position to his or her detriment.
478 A.2d 351, 355 (N.J. 1984).
93. See, e.g., Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1168-69 (D.C. 1993) (holding that equitable
estoppel is not applicable where the husband was unaware of facts surrounding child's
conception); Jefferson v. Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (asserting
that equitable estoppel "has never been applied where the wife has falsely misrepresented
to the husband his paternity of the child, and he has acted on that misrepresentation until
discovering the truth"); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (hold-
ing that the husband did not knowingly misrepresent parentage to child where the wife
misrepresented parentage to husband); cf Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569, 576 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995) (holding that estoppel principles were inapplicable despite a husband's knowl-
edge that he was not child's biological father, where husband was "operating under the
misrepresentation that an 'unknown' man had fathered the child").
94. See, e.g., K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. 1994) (requiring financial
detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel); Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 537-38, 510
A.2d 546, 551 (1986) (finding that estoppel did not apply absent financial detriment);
Miller, 478 A.2d at 358 (holding that estoppel applies only where stepparent's actions pre-
cluded child from obtaining future support from a nonparty biological parent). See gener-
ally W. v. W., 728 A.2d 1076, 108-85 (Conn. 1999) (discussing cases and describing as a
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example where a husband "actively interferes" with the child's ability
to obtain support from a biological father-will estoppel principles
prevail.95 Ironically, federal child support policy now makes it diffi-
cult to establish such financial detriment because federal law requires
that states extend statutes of limitation for paternity actions until a
child's eighteenth birthday.96
Moreover, because estoppel is an equitable doctrine, courts often
consider the mother's conduct in deciding whether to apply the doc-
trine.97 Thus, even where a marital father's conduct toward a child
might otherwise estop him from later denying paternity, that conclu-
sion can be overcome (as it was in Doran) by what the court sees as the
mother's fraudulent or misleading actions.98 Perhaps ironically in this
context, estoppel principles are much more likely to be useful in
preventing mothers from disestablishing their husband's paternity
(where a husband seeks to retain parental status despite the lack of
biological connection) than in limiting the ability of marital fathers to
sever their legal connections with the children that they have raised.99
"majority rule" the position that "emotional detriment alone [is] insufficient grounds for
estoppel").
95. W., 728 A.2d at 1084-85.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (5) (A) (i)-(ii) (2000).
97. See, e.g., W, 728 A.2d at 1085 (characterizing estoppel as "an extraordinary mea-
sure" that must be applied "judiciously and with sensitivity to the facts particular to each
case").
98. Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (concluding that,
although Doran held himself out as the child's father for more than eleven years, he was
not estopped from denying paternity because he "would not have held the child out as his
own had it not been for [the mother's] fraudulent conduct"); see Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d at
517 (holding that estoppel is not available where a wife has falsely misrepresented paternity
to her husband); J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ("Under certain circum-
stances, fraud/misrepresentation can preclude the application of paternity by estoppel.");
Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405, 410 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that the trial court must
consider conduct of the mother and alleged biological father in determining whether to apply paternity
by estoppel).
99. See Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501, 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to allow
mother and alleged biological father to rebut the marital presumption of paternity, noting
that "public policy will not permit a mother and an alleged father to enlist the aid of the
courts to disturb the emotional ties existing between a child and his legal father after
sitting on their rights for the first three years of the child's life"); Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J.,
677 N.W.2d 630, 641 (Wis. 2004) (finding that the mother was equitably estopped from
rebutting the marital presumption at divorce where she failed to raise the paternity issue
until her child was fifteen months old and her husband had paid all birthing expenses and
developed a close emotional relationship with the child); Roberts, supra note 9, at 54 (not-
ing that where a wife seeks to disestablish paternity, but HER husband "wishes to maintain
a parent-child relationship and offers to assume the emotional and financial responsibili-
ties of fatherhood, most courts try to maintain that relationship").
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D. Best Interests
Finally, several courts have held that, before allowing a marital
parent to disestablish paternity, a court must consider the best inter-
ests of the child. For example, in Baker v. Baker,' the Georgia Su-
preme Court held that the best-interests standard applied to a
mother's attempt, during a divorce action, to rebut the marital pre-
sumption in response to her husband's claim for custody. The court
noted that the case presented
an unusual set of facts in that it involves a legal father who,
despite knowing he is not the child's biological father and
that the biological mother no longer wants him to be consid-
ered the father, nonetheless has made non-court-ordered
child support payments to the mother and has made serious
and prolonged efforts to maintain his parental relationship
with the child.1"1
Under these circumstances, the court held that it was appropriate to
consider the child's best-interests before allowing the mother to chal-
lenge her husband's presumed legal StatUS.
10 2
Similarly, in Evans v. Wilson,' °3 the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that the best-interests standard governed an alleged biological
father's request for genetic testing to establish his paternity of a child
born to a woman married to another man. The Maryland court ac-
knowledged that state law automatically provided for genetic testing
to determine the paternity of children born outside of marriage but
held that a different standard applied to paternity disputes involving
marital children.10 4 The appellate court also upheld the trial judge's
finding that genetic testing would be contrary to this child's best inter-
ests because the putative father had failed to show a strong bond be-
tween himself and the child and because his request for genetic
testing threatened to dismantle an existing family unit. 10
While the addition of a best-interests inquiry represents a step in
the right direction in that it focuses on the child's needs, the best-
interests standard has significant shortcomings as a rule ofjudicial de-
cision. The standard is cumbersome and fact-specific. It has been
100. 582 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. 2003).
101. Id. at 105.
102. Id.; cf Randy A.J, 677 N.W.2d at 639 (interpreting a Wisconsin paternity statute
providing for the best-interests inquiry to apply only where genetic tests have not yet been
completed).
103. 382 Md. 614, 856 A.2d 679 (2004).
104. Id. at 633-36, 856 A.2d at 688-92.
105. Id. at 636-38, 856 A.2d at 692-93.
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criticized in other contexts for its indeterminacy and susceptibility to
judicial manipulation. 10 6 The unpredictability of the standard en-
courages litigation and works to the disadvantage of the more risk-
averse party.10 7 Moreover, because the standard allows for so much
judicial discretion, appellate review is difficult, and "[p] rior reported
cases now provide little basis for controlling or predicting the out-
come of a particular case."10 8 Indeed, several commentators have ar-
gued that requiring an individualized best-interests inquiry in every
case may undermine children's overall interests-both by compromis-
ing family integrity and by increasing the costs of legal decisionmak-
ing.109 Thus, while most courts invoke the best-interests standard to
resolve custody disputes between legally recognized parents, there is
considerably more dissent about whether the standard is an appropri-
ate vehicle for assigning or terminating parental status.
III. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
So what are the options for legal reform? I can envision two ap-
proaches that point in opposite directions. One approach would be
to succumb to biological determinism and embrace the technology
that makes it possible. This approach would mandate (or strongly en-
courage) universal paternity testing at birth for both married and un-
married parents. Parental status would be determined based on the
results of that testing-or assumed voluntarily in the face of it-and
marriage per se would have little relevance. In a recent law review
article, two well-known family law scholars proposed such a mandatory
106. See, e.g., IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAw: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 565 (4th ed.
2004) ("As a broad discretionary standard, the best interests test does little to constrain
judges who might be inclined to base the custody decision on their personal moral and
social values."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 615, 622 (1992) (describing limitations of the best-interests standard).
107. Scott, supra note 106, at 653 ("An imprecise rule such as the best interests standard
imposes particularly heavy costs on the party who is more risk-averse about the outcome of
adjudication.").
108. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 253-54 (1975); see Evans, 382 Md. at 623, 856
A.2d at 684 ("Questions regarding the best interests of a child fall generally within the
sound discretion of the trial court and ordinarily will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse
of discretion."). Additionally, the Evans court noted that "[a] bsent a clear abuse of discre-
tion, an appellate court ordinarily will not disturb a trial court's assessment of the best
interests of a child." Id. at 637, 856 A.2d at 693.
109. E.g.,Jon Elster, SolomonicJudgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHi. L.
REv. 1, 22-26 (1987); cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000) (criticizing the use of
the best-interests standard to award grandparent visitation rights).
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paternity-testing regime, arguing that it would provide certainty for
parents and stability for children.1 0
I find this approach unappealing for several reasons. For one
thing, it would operate prospectively only; it therefore would not ad-
dress the burgeoning number of disestablishment cases involving ex-
isting marital children. Mandatory paternity testing also runs the risk
of disrupting a significant number of marriages. Although hard evi-
dence is difficult to come by, the few empirical studies that do exist
suggest that upwards of ten percent of children born to married wo-
men are not, in fact, the biological offspring of the mother's hus-
band."'1 To be sure, one might argue that these marriages are already
in trouble and that many of them would eventually end in divorce-
but I suspect that the reality is more complex. More philosophically, I
fear that adoption of such a universal-testing regime overemphasizes
the importance of biology and underemphasizes the relevance of mar-
riage in providing support and encouraging paternal investment in
children. '12
So I would take the opposite approach. I would begin by recog-
nizing that marriage matters-and should continue to matter-in de-
termining legal parenthood. Specifically, I would reinvigorate the
marital presumption to provide that marriage ordinarily constitutes a
legally sufficient basis (albeit not a necessary or an exclusive one) for
ascribing paternal rights and responsibilities. This recognition re-
flects thejudgment that parenthood-and particularly fatherhood-is
primarily a legal and social construct, not a biological fact. 1 3 As Eliza-
110. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relation-
ship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1011, 1066-70 (2003). Fur-
thermore, several European countries have implemented something resembling
mandatory paternity establishment for children born outside of marriage. See W. Craig
Williams, Note, The Paradox of Paternity Establishment: As Rights Go Up, Rates Go Down, 8 U.
FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 261, 271-79 (1997) (discussing paternity establishment procedures in
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands).
111. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
323, 324 (2004) (citing studies indicating that "surprisingly high percentages of children
born in the context of marriage or marriage-like relationships are not genetically related to
their mothers' partners, the men who have been functioning as their fathers"); Ellman,
supra note 17, at 55-57 (concluding that "the professional consensus is that the rate of
paternal discrepancy for couples in stable unions, whether legally married or cohabitating,
is from ten to fifteen percent").
112. Mandating paternity testing at birth for children born to unmarried--but not to
married-mothers would raise serious equal-protection concerns.
113. The law's treatment of children born as a result of assisted-reproduction tech-
niques underscores this conception of parenthood. A husband who consents to assisted
reproduction is treated as the legal father of any resulting child, regardless of his lack of
biological ties. Roberts, supra note 9, at 47-48; see Nanette Elster, Who Is the Parent in Clon-
ing?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533, 538 (1999) ("Under artificial insemination laws, if a man
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beth Bartholet put it recently, "[I]aw decides who is and who is not a
parent and whether and on what basis someone who is a parent is
allowed to stop being one.""' 4 And the available social science evi-
dence suggests that there continues to be persuasive reasons for rec-
ognizing husbands as legal fathers of the children born during a
marriage.
Second, I would provide marital parents with a relatively short
window for challenging the presumed link between marriage and
parenthood. Here, the two-year limitations period contained in the
new Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) seems about right.'15 Such a finite
limitations period makes sense from both the child's and the pre-
sumed parents' point of view. It ensures that, if legal parentage is
disputed, the dispute is aired before the child has had the opportunity
to develop a deep emotional bond with an adult who is functioning as
a parent. And it gives a spouse adequate time to assert that his or her
marriage was not one that included a commitment to co-parenting at
the time the child was born. For disestablishment claims brought
within this two-year time period, DNA evidence would be freely con-
sidered and would generally trump the marital presumption.1 16
provides sperm for the artificial insemination of a consenting woman and her consenting
husband, that couple, and not the sperm donor, are recognized as the legal parents of any
child born as a result of the procedure."). Indeed, a substantial number of states have
enacted statutes providing that a sperm donor is not the legal father. Linda D. Elrod &
Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Century Ends with Unresolved Issues, 33
FAM. L.Q. 865, 918 chart 9 (2000) (showing that Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming have laws to this effect).
114. Bartholet, supra note 111, at 325.
115. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 31 (Supp. 2005). The
two-year time limit does not apply if: "(1) the presumed father and the mother of the child
neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable
time of conception; and (2) the presumed father never openly held out the child as his
own." Id. § 607(b)(1)-(2), 9B U.L.A. at 31. The UPA also allows a husband, wife, and
nonmarital, biological father to rebut the marital presumption through the use of a volun-
tary acknowledgement process if all three parties wish to do so. Id. §§ 302-304, 9B U.L.A.
314-16 (2000). Such a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity by the nonmarital father
and the husband's accompanying denial are binding on all three parties once sixty days
have passed. Id §§ 305, 307, 9B U.L.A. at 316-17. The UPA also incorporates the doctrine
of paternity by estoppel. Id. § 608, 9B U.L.A. 32-33 (Supp. 2005). For a discussion of these
UPA provisions, see Roberts, supra note 14, at 65-66. To date, Delaware, North Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have adopted the Act. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION-
ERS, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, A Few Facts About the
Uniform Parentage Act (2002), http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact-factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-upa.asp.
116. In an article published while this Article was being edited, Professor Melanie Jacobs
proposed a similar two-year statute of limitations for most paternity disestablishment
claims. SeeJacobs, supra note 82, at 233-37. Unlike the approach advocated here, however,
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After that, the grounds for rebutting the marital presumption
would be significantly more limited. In particular, biological evidence
of nonpaternity-standing alone-would not suffice, and there would
be no entitlement to court-ordered DNA testing. Instead, the inquiry
would focus on the child's interests, and the burden of proof would be
on the party seeking to overcome the presumption; thus, a husband
(or wife) who sought, more than two years after a child's birth, to
disestablish the husband's status as a legal father would be required to
show that such disestablishment would serve the child's best interests.
Such a showing would ordinarily be difficult to make, particularly if
the child had established a bond with the presumed father during the
marriage. Moreover, because the inquiry would focus on the child's
interests, the mother's conduct toward the presumed father would not
be relevant.
Third, I would rethink the notion of fatherhood as an exclusive
legal status. 117 One of the reasons that biological determinism has
such appeal in this context is the assumption embedded in paternity
jurisprudence that there can be one and only one legal father.' If,
however, parenthood is a socially constructed status, rather than a bio-
logical fact, then there is no inherent reason why it must be exclusive.
Indeed, family law developments in a number of areas already reflect
the notion that a child may have legally protected relationships with
multiple parent figures. For example, a number of states now protect
the legal bonds between children and stepparents, even after dissolu-
tion of the stepparent's marriage to the child's biological parent.1 1 9
Jacobs's proposal would require a best-interests finding even within the two-year time pe-
riod. Id. at 236.
117. lam by no means the first legal scholar to question the notion of parenthood as an
exclusive legal status. In particular, Katharine Bartlett and Nancy Polikoff have argued
eloquently for recognizing multiple parenthood in contexts other than paternity establish-
ment. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives Mhen the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879 (1984);
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459 (1990); see also
Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening
Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 180-82 (1999) (discussing legal recognition of
"multiple parenthood" in context of divorce, stepparent, and grandparent relationships);
Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Rela-
tionships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358, 393-96 (1994) (advocating greater
legal protection of relationships between children and adults who, despite not being the
legal parents, have assumed parent-like responsibilities for the children).
118. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (plurality opinion)
("California law, like nature itself, makefs no provision for dual fatherhood.").
119. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(VI) (1992) (authorizing custody and visita-
tion awards to stepparents if a court determines it is in the best interests and welfare of the
child); Logan v. Logan, 730 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Miss. 1998) (holding that a stepfather can
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In addition, the growing acceptance of open adoption-where a child
is adopted but retains legal ties to one or both birth parents-suggests
that parenthood is not necessarily a "zero sum game."1 20 Recent court
decisions recognizing the custody and visitation claims of nonbiologi-
cal lesbian co-parents reflect a similar, non-exclusive understanding of
parenthood.121 More generally, the legal concepts of "equitable par-
ent" and "parent by estoppel" reflected in the American Law Insti-
tute's recent Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution envision that
more than one adult of each gender can share parental status. 122
Finally, a small but growing number of cases indicate that courts
are beginning to accept the possibility that a child can have more than
one legal father. 23 For example, at least one state-Louisiana-rec-
be awarded custody); see also Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23, 30 (Vt. 1985) (overturning
a lower court's dismissal of a stepfather's petition for custody). See generally Jennifer Klein
Mangnall, Stepparent Custody Rights After Divorce, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 399, 418-22 (1997) (advo-
caring greater legal protection of stepparent-child relationships); Bryce Levine, Note, Di-
vorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco Parentis Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of
Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 315, 34245 (1996) (arguing
that stepparents in loco parentis with stepchildren should be permitted to seek custody in a
divorce).
120. See generally Cahn & Singer, supra note 117, at 181-82 (discussing the growing recog-
nition of open adoption); Tammy M. Somogye, Comment, Opening Minds to Open Adoption,
45 U. KAN. L. REv. 619, 628 (1997) (surveying state laws on open adoption and advocating
the passage of an open-adoption statute in Kansas).
121. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 977 (R.I. 2000) (permitting a former
nonbiological lesbian co-parent to bring action for visitation with the child she had helped
to raise); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (Mass. 1999) (same); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748
A.2d 539, 553-54 (N.J. 2000) (same).
122. AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS 107-08 (2002) (defining parent by estoppel and de facto parent). Signifi-
candy, the comments to this section note that the fact that a child already has two (or
more) legal parents "is not dispositive" in determining whether parenthood by estoppel is
in the child's best interests. Id. at 115; see also id. at 414-15 (recognizing that "[t]he court
may in exceptional cases impose a parental support obligation upon a person who may not
be the child's parent under state law, but whose prior course of affirmative conduct equita-
bly estops that person from denying a parental support obligation"); Sarah H. Ramsey,
Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents by Estoppel and De Facto Parents Under the
American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y
285, 285 (2001) (-The Principles adopt the theory that parenthood should be a non-exclu-
sive status when a child is not living in a nuclear family."). For a thoughtful discussion of
these provisions, see James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The
American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REv. 923
(2001).
123. See, e.g., Griffith v. Pell, 881 So. 2d 184, 186 (Miss. 2004) (reversing termination of
divorced husband's parental rights on the grounds that "[m]erely because another man
was determined to be the minor child's biological father does not automatically negate the
father-daughter relationship held by Robert and the minor child"); Christensen v. Chris-
tensen, 868 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (suggesting that both the
stepfather and biological father of teenage girl may have some responsibility for financial
support). See generally Press Release, Paula Roberts, Paternity Disestablishment in 2004-
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ognizes the common-law concept of dual paternity-which allows a
nonmarital, biological father to establish a legal connection with a
child born during the mother's marriage to someone else, without
erasing the rights and responsibilities of the marital father.1 24 Such
recognition of dual paternity offers a way of reconciling a revitalized
marital presumption with the interests of a nonmarital biological fa-
ther who has established a relationship with a marital child.
1 25
To be sure, implementing the concepts of equitable parenthood
and dual paternity raises serious legal and practical challenges that go
beyond the scope of this Article, but their appearance in case law and
in the ALI Principles suggests that the Supreme Court got it wrong
when it asserted over a decade ago that the legal system, "like nature
itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood. 126
Revitalizing the marital presumption offers at least one other im-
portant benefit. In the ongoing "culture wars" over whether and how
the state should "privilege" marriage, a revitalized marital presump-
tion offers a "win-win" solution, at least for children. It is likely to
benefit children born into a marriage without disadvantaging or stig-
matizing children born outside of it. In other words, a revitalized
marital presumption recognizes that while there are multiple paths to
legal parenthood, marriage in and of itself is one such path and that
committing to marriage creates obligations and connections to chil-
dren that cannot easily be undone.
2005 (June 10, 2005), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/paternity-update-
061005.pdf (surveying recent case law in various states dealing with paternity
disestablishment).
124. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854-55 (La. 1989) (deciding that Louisiana law
allows for dual paternity). For a discussion of dual paternity as a potential solution to the
racial and gender prejudices reflected in the traditional law of legitimacy, see Mary Louise
Fellows, A Feminist Interpretation of the Law of Legitimacy, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 195, 205-06
(1998).
125. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 150-53 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing the nature of the biological father's interest in maintaining a relationship with
the child who was born while the mother was married to another man).
126. Id. at 118 (plurality opinion).
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